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Extending a strategy previously used by Clancy, Schacter, McNally, and Pitman (2000), we administered
a neutral and a trauma-related version of the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm to a sample of women
reporting recovered (n = 23) or repressed memories (n = 16) of childhood sexual abuse (CSA), women
reporting having always remembered their abuse (n = 55), and women reporting no history of abuse
(n = 20). We found that individuals reporting recovered memories of CSA are more prone than other par-
ticipants to falsely recalling and recognizing neutral words that were never presented. Moreover, our study
is the ﬁrst to show that this ﬁnding even held when trauma-related material was involved. Correlational
analyses revealed that fantasy proneness, but not self-reported traumatic experiences and dissociative
symptoms were related to false recall and false recognition.
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McNally, Clancy, and their colleagues were among the ﬁrst to apply experimental methods to
investigate memory functioning in women reporting repressed and recovered memories of child-
hood sexual abuse (CSA). In one of their studies, Clancy, Schacter, McNally, and Pitman (2000)
made use of the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) task (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott,
1995), a paradigm that is very eﬀective in eliciting false memories. In the DRM paradigm, partic-
ipants study a list of words that are strong semantic associates of a word not presented on the
list—the critical lure. For example, participants may study words like bed, rest, awake, tired,
and so forth, all of which are strongly related to the nonpresented critical item, sleep. On a sub-
sequent test, participants often falsely recall and recognize the critical lure (e.g., sleep).
Clancy et al. (2000) used this paradigm to examine whether participants reporting recovered
memories of CSA would be more prone than others to develop false memories in the DRM par-
adigm. In their study, control women reporting no history of abuse, and women reporting recov-
ered, repressed, or continuous memories of CSA underwent the DRM task. Clancy et al. (2000)
found that, relative to the other groups, women reporting recovered CSA memories more often
falsely recognized the nonpresented critical lures. This suggests that these women relied more
on memory for gist than on verbatim memory traces of the individual words they had studied
(e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 1998). Two further studies employed the DRM paradigm to examine
memory functioning in people reporting traumatic experiences. Bremner, Shobe, and Kihlstrom
(2000) studied women with continuous memories of CSA who were suﬀering from posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD). The authors found that these women displayed a higher frequency of false
recognition than abused women without PTSD. Zoellner, Foa, Brigidi, and Przeworski (2000) re-
ported that victims of criminal assaults with or without PTSD more often falsely recalled critical
nonpresented words than did nontraumatized participants. Thus, the literature on DRM perfor-
mance of people reporting traumatic experiences allows for two interpretations. On the one hand,
one could argue that the raised frequencies of false recall in people with recovered memories show
that they are especially susceptible to develop pseudomemories. On the other hand, there are indi-
cations that people who have been traumatized exhibit memory impairments of which heightened
levels of false recall on the DRM paradigm might be a manifestation (Zoellner et al., 2000).
Although the DRM paradigm creates striking memory illusions, Freyd and Gleaves (1996)
questioned the relevance of the DRM paradigm to real world examples of alleged false memories
(e.g., in recovered CSA memories or eyewitness testimony). They noted that the real world scenar-
ios where false memories may occur typically involve highly emotional events (e.g., CSA), whereas
words used in the DRM paradigm are not emotionally charged and hence not trauma-related.
Freyd and Gleaves (1996) hypothesized that the frequency of false recall and recognition in the
DRM paradigm would be lowered when trauma-related items would be used, due to their emo-
tional distinctiveness. Our study is the ﬁrst to address this issue by employing neutral and trauma-
related DRM lists to traumatized individuals. We investigated whether participants who reported
having recovered CSA memories displayed higher rates of false recall and recognition for neutral
and trauma-related words relative to other participants.
A subsidiary aim of our study concerned the issue of whether certain traits are associated with
performance on the DRM task. More speciﬁcally, we examined whether individual diﬀerences in
fantasy proneness and dissociation are connected to false recall and recognition in the DRM task.
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tasy proneness, predisposed to false memory eﬀects in the DRM task, would also be predisposed
to have pseudomemories. Conversely, CSA might create dissociative tendencies that may lead to
enhanced false memory eﬀects on the DRM task. Previous research, for example, has shown that
people scoring high on the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES; Bernstein & Putnam, 1986) are
susceptible to memory distortions induced by various laboratory tests (e.g., Eisen & Lynn, 2001),
including the DRM paradigm (Clancy et al., 2000; Winograd, Peluso, & Glover, 1998). A number
of authors have noted that there is a considerable overlap between dissociation and fantasy prone-
ness (e.g., Merckelbach & Muris, 2001; Rauschenberger & Lynn, 1995). We also obtained partic-
ipants scores on the Childhood Trauma Questionnaire (CTQ; Bernstein et al., 2003). If false
memories in the DRM paradigm are a manifestation of memory impairment due to traumatiza-
tion, one would expect a robust correlation between false memories on the DRM task and CTQ
scores. If, on the other hand, the DRM paradigm primarily taps susceptibility to pseudomemor-
ies, one would expect a signiﬁcant association between such false memories and fantasy
proneness.2. Method
2.1. Participants
Following the procedure of Clancy et al. (2000), we recruited participants through advertise-
ments in local newspapers. In these advertisements, we invited women to come to our lab when
they (a) had recovered CSA memories, (b) believed they had been sexually abused as a child,
(c) had a history of sexual abuse which had never been forgotten or (d) had no history of sexual
abuse. The study was described as a research project on memory and personality. The study was
approved by the standing Ethical Committee of the Faculty of Psychology, University of
Maastricht.
After providing written informed consent, a semi-structured memory interview was conducted
to classify participants into one of the groups (see also Clancy et al., 2000). Individuals reporting
repressed, recovered, and continuous memories of CSA were asked whether they had obtained
information from others (e.g., sibling) or had physical evidence (e.g., letters, medical records) that
could validate the CSA memories.
2.1.1. Recovered memory group
The recovered memory group consisted of 23 women (mean age = 41.6 years, SD = 10.9) who
said having previously forgotten and subsequently recalled memories of CSA. Eight participants
(35%) had recovered memories of CSA during psychotherapy. Most of the other women in this
group recovered memories of CSA after having been exposed to certain cues (e.g., a friend
who tells about CSA experiences, the birth of their own child). The majority (22 women; 96%)
reported that their recovered memories had a signiﬁcant impact on their lives. Only one partici-
pant could give corroborative evidence for the abuse, namely a statement of the perpetrator him-
self. However, in most cases, women lost contact with their families after having confronted them
with recovered CSA memories.
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The repressed memory group comprised 16 women (mean age = 43.9 years, SD = 6.8)
who believed that they had been sexually abused as a child, but had no explicit autobio-
graphical memories of CSA. These women cited a diversity of symptoms they thought indi-
cated a history of CSA (e.g., relationship problems, depressive symptoms, and eating
disorders). Some reported vague feelings of nervousness when they were near certain rela-
tives who, they believed, might had abused them. The majority (13 women; 81%) of this
group reported that their CSA had a traumatic impact on their lives. It was, of course,
impossible for us to determine whether they had been abused. The term repressed memory
describes their belief.
2.1.3. Continuous memory group
The continuous memory group comprised 55 women (mean age = 43.1 years, SD = 14.4) who
said that they had never forgotten their abuse. Forty-ﬁve (82%) women reported that their CSA
could be seen as traumatic. Nineteen (35%) provided the name of a person who could corroborate
the abuse (e.g., a sibling who had been abused at the same time, the perpetrator himself). One par-
ticipant gave us a court document that stated that her father had been indicted for sexually abus-
ing her. Some women in this group indicated that witnesses who could provide evidence for the
CSA had deceased.
2.1.4. Control group
The control group comprised 20 women (mean age = 41.5, SD = 12) who said that they had
neither during childhood nor during adulthood ever been sexually abused.
2.2. Measures
A number of self-report scales and tasks were administered to the sample. Here, we only discuss
those that are directly relevant to the issue of DRM performance and its correlates.
2.2.1. Self-report scales
The Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES; Cronbachs a = .92; Bernstein & Putnam, 1986) is a
28-item self-report measure that asks respondents how often they experience dissociative symp-
toms like derealization and depersonalization. Items are scored on 100-mm Visual Analogue
Scales (VASs). Scores are summed to obtain a total DES score (range 0–100), with higher scores
indicating higher dissociative tendencies. The DES exhibits high internal consistency and test–re-
test correlations ranging from .74 to .84. Van IJzendoorn and Schuengel (1996) have shown that
the DES has excellent psychometric properties.
The Creative Experiences Questionnaire (CEQ; Cronbachs a = .79; Merckelbach, Muris, &
Rassin, 1999) is a measure that is based on Wilson and Barbers (1983) listing of fantasy proneness
characteristics. The CEQ includes 25 dichotomous (yes/no) items that cover experiences related to
daydreaming, imagining, and intense fantasizing. Psychometric research (for a review, see Merc-
kelbach, Horselenberg, & Muris, 2001) has shown that the CEQ possesses adequate reliability in
terms of internal consistency and test–retest stability. Furthermore, the CEQ has predictive
validity in the sense that certain categories of persons who are known to exhibit fantasy-prone
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this scale than control participants.
The Childhood Trauma Questionnaire (CTQ; Cronbachs a = .82; Bernstein et al., 2003) is a
widely used psychometrically sound self-report scale of aversive childhood experiences. The short
form consists of 25 items that address ﬁve areas of childhood maltreatment, namely emotional,
physical, and sexual abuse, and emotional and physical neglect. Each area is represented with ﬁve
items. Items are rated on 5-point scales anchored 1 (never) and 5 (very often). A total CTQ score
can be obtained by summing scores on individual items, of which some have to be recoded before
the sum can be calculated. A number of recent nonclinical (e.g., Irwin, 2001; Merckelbach, Horse-
lenberg, & Schmidt, 2002) as well as clinical studies (e.g., Carrion & Steiner, 2000; Gast, Rode-
wald, Nickel, & Emerich, 2001) on trauma and dissociation employed this measure. Moreover,
Bernstein, Ahluvalia, Pogge, and Handelsman (1997) showed that the psychometric properties
of the CTQ are satisfactory.
2.2.2. DRM paradigm
The 10 neutral word lists used in the current study were derived from lists previously employed
in our lab (Peters, Jelicic, Haas, & Merckelbach, submitted). Extensive pilot work showed that
they produce rates of false recall and recognition comparable to those reported by Roediger
and McDermott (1995). Adopting the procedure of Peters et al., the 10 trauma-related word lists
were constructed as follows. For each critical trauma-related lure, we developed a corresponding
word list by obtaining the ﬁrst 15 associates listed in Lauteslager, Schaap, and Schievels (1986)
and van Loon-Vervoorn and van Bekkum (1991) word association norms. For example, the ﬁrst
5 associates corresponding to assault were rape, police, beating, child, and violence. On all lists,
associates were presented in decreasing order of associative strength. The 10 neutral and 10 trau-
ma-related lists were counterbalanced across participants.
The recognition test consisted of 120 words; 60 (30 neutral and 30 trauma-related words) had
been presented in the study phase, while 60 (30 neutral and 30 trauma-related) were new items.
The 60 studied items were obtained by selecting three items from each list from serial positions
1, 8, and 10. The 60 new items included the 20 critical lures associated with the study words
(e.g., needle, assault), 20 (10 neutral and 10 trauma-related) words unrelated to any words on
the list, and 20 (10 neutral and 10 trauma-related) words weakly related to words on the list.
2.3. Procedure
All participants were tested individually during a session that lasted for approximately 2 h.
First, women completed the self-report scales and after a delay of 30 min, they underwent the
DRM task. Participants were instructed that they would see several lists of words on a computer
screen and that following each list, they would be asked to write down these words. They were
told to write down the last few words they had heard (which is a standard instruction for this task)
and then to write down the rest of the words they remembered in any order. They were instructed
to write down as many words they could remember, provided they were reasonably conﬁdent that
these words had been on the list (i.e., they were told not to guess). During the study phase, each
word remained for 3 s on the computer screen. Participants were given 2.5 min to recall each list.
After the 20th list, there was a brief conversation lasting 2–3 min. Subsequently, participants were
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word had appeared on any of the studied lists.3. Results
3.1. Self-report scores
Table 1 shows demographic and psychometric data for the subgroups. One-way Analyses of
Variance (ANOVAs) revealed that subgroups did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly in age or educational le-
vel: both Fs (3,110) < 1.0, ns. However, subgroups diﬀered signiﬁcantly with respect to all self-re-
port scales. Both the recovered and repressed memory subgroups reported more dissociative
symptoms (DES) than the continuous memory group and the control group (all ts > 2.1, all
ps < .03). Post hoc tests (LSD) indicated that women with recovered, repressed, or continuous
CSA memories scored higher on fantasy proneness (CEQ) and childhood trauma (CTQ) than
control women reporting no history of abuse (all ts > 3.8, all ps < .001).
3.2. Recall
3.2.1. Neutral lists
Correct recall (i.e., mean proportion of recall of studied words), false recall of critical lures and
nonstudied words other than the critical lures (i.e., mean proportion of recall of nonstudied crit-
ical lures and of nonstudied words other than the critical lures) are shown in Table 2. Because we
had no speciﬁc predictions about correct recall, we performed ANOVAs followed by post hoc
contrasts (LSD). Results revealed that all groups displayed equivalent rates of correct recall:
F (3,110) < 1.0, ns. Participants recalled 56% of the words presented in the neutral lists correctly.
To test whether recovered memory participants displayed higher levels of false recall than the
other groups, we computed the false recall rate (i.e., false recall of critical lures minus false recall
of nonstudied words other than the critical lures) and applied contrast weights of 3, 1, 1, and
1 to the recovered, repressed, continuous, and control subgroups, respectively. Women with
recovered memories of CSA had a higher rate of false recall compared to the repressed, contin-
uous, and control group, t (110) = 4.30, p < .001, eﬀect size r = .43.Table 1
Demographic data and mean scores of subgroups on the DES, CEQ, and CTQ
Recovered n = 23 Repressed n = 16 Continuous n = 55 Control n = 20 F p
Measure M M M M
Age (years) 41.6 (10.9) 43.9 (6.8) 43.1 (14.4) 41.5 (12.0) .18 .91
Education (level) 5.1 (1.5) 5.4 (1.7) 4.7 (1.8) 5.5 (1.8) 1.2 .31
DES 30.1 (19.4) 31.5 (11.6) 22.2 (12.6) 12.9 (9.0) 7.4 <.001
CEQ 7.7 (2.8) 9.4 (5.2) 8.2 (3.6) 4.2 (3.5) 6.5 <.001
CTQ 39.9 (9.9) 35.3 (10.3) 37.2 (11.3) 25.5 (4.4) 8.6 <.001
Note. Educational level varies on a scale from 0 (no primary school) to 8 (university degree). Standard deviations are in
parentheses.
Table 2
Proportion of recalled studied words, critical lures, and nonstudied words other than the critical lure for neutral and
trauma-related lists
Recovered
n = 23
Repressed
n = 16
Continuous
n = 55
Control
n = 20
Word type M M M M
Neutral studied words .56 (.11) .56 (.08) .55 (.11) .59(.09)
Neutral critical lures .61 (.18) .46 (.21) .42 (.18) .44 (.16)
Neutral nonstudied words other than critical lures .14 (.19) .22 (.20) .21 (.19) .14 (.12)
Trauma-related studied words .42 (.09) .43 (.08) .42 (.11) .46 (.08)
Trauma-related critical lures .20 (.10) .16 (.17) .14 (.11) .13 (.13)
Trauma-related nonstudied words other than critical lures .20 (.17) .18 (.16) .13 (.08) .13 (.12)
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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ANOVAs followed by post hoc contrasts (LSD) showed that all participants displayed similar
rates of correct recall for trauma-related words, F (3,110) < 1.0, ns, with a mean proportion of re-
call of 43%.
Performing the earlier mentioned contrast analysis on false recall rate, we found a nonsigniﬁ-
cant diﬀerence between the groups: t (110) = .84, p > .05, eﬀect size r = .19. Curiously enough, for
the trauma-related lists, critical lures were recalled at a low rate of 15%.
3.3. Recognition
3.3.1. Neutral lists
Hit rate (i.e., mean proportion of correct recognition) and false alarm for critical lures and non-
studied words other than the critical lures (i.e., mean proportion of recognition of nonstudied crit-
ical lures and of nonstudied words other than the critical lures) are shown in Table 3. ANOVAs
indicated that all groups exhibited similar rates of correct recognition of neutral words,
F (3,110) < 1.0, ns. Overall, studied words were recognized at a rate of 74%.
To test whether recovered memory participants displayed higher rates of false recognition than
the other groups, we computed the false recognition rate (i.e., false recognition of critical luresTable 3
Proportion of recognized studied words, critical lures, and nonstudied words other than the critical lure for neutral and
trauma-related lists
Recovered
n = 23
Repressed
n = 16
Continuous
n = 55
Control
n = 20
Word type M M M M
Neutral studied words .76 (.09) .75 (.09) .72 (.15) .74 (.15)
Neutral critical lures .86 (.08) .78 (.17) .73 (.19) .72 (.09)
Neutral nonstudied words other than critical lures .06 (.04) .09 (.06) .04 (.03) .06 (.03)
Trauma-related studied words .85 (.09) .79 (.15) .83 (.12) .86 (.10)
Trauma-related critical lures .91 (.09) .81 (.14) .74 (.17) .73 (.08)
Trauma-related nonstudied words other than critical lures .20 (.16) .19 (.14) .16 (.10) .17 (.08)
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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trast weights of 3, 1, 1, and 1 to the recovered, repressed, continuous, and control group,
respectively. A signiﬁcant diﬀerence was found, t (110) = 3.17, p = .002, eﬀect size r = .30, demon-
strating that women with recovered memories of CSA more often falsely recognized critical lures
than the other women.
3.3.2. Trauma-related lists
The groups showed equivalent rates of accurate recognition for trauma-related words:
F (3,110) < 1.0, ns. Overall, 83% of the studied words were correctly recognized.
Analysis with contrast weights indicated that women with recovered CSA memories had a high-
er rate of false recognition of trauma-related critical lures than the other groups, t (110) = 2.46,
p = .015, eﬀect size r = .28.
3.4. Individual diﬀerences and DRM performance
Table 4 shows Pearson correlations between DRM scores, dissociation, fantasy proneness, and
childhood trauma. DES scores were signiﬁcantly associated with unrelated intrusions on recall
tests (neutral lists: r = .23, p < .05; trauma-related lists: r = .25, p < .001) and false recognition
of unrelated trauma words (r = .37, p < .001). However, correlations between DES and false recall
and recognition of critical lures fell short of signiﬁcance (all rs < .16, ps > .09). CEQ correlated
signiﬁcantly with false recall and recognition of neutral and trauma-related critical lures (all
rs > .19, all ps < .05). Self-reported childhood trauma (CTQ) did not correlate signiﬁcantly with
any false recall or recognition parameter (all rs < .15, all ps > .12).4. Discussion
The purpose of this study was to determine whether women reporting recovered CSA memories
would show enhanced false recall and recognition on a neutral and trauma-related version of theTable 4
Pearson product-moment correlations between dissociative symptoms (DES), fantasy proneness (CEQ), self-reported
childhood trauma (CTQ), and recall and recognition parameters
DES CEQ CTQ
Recall Neutral critical lures .11 .21* .10
Neutral nonstudied words other than critical lures .23** .07 .09
Trauma-related critical lures .10 .22* .02
Trauma-related nonstudied words other than critical lures .25** .01 .15
Recognition Neutral critical lures .10 .22* .14
Neutral nonstudied words other than critical lures .09 .09 .08
Trauma-related critical lures .16 .19* .11
Trauma-related nonstudied words other than critical lures .37** .05 .07
* Correlation is signiﬁcant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is signiﬁcant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
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found with the DRM paradigm (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). That is, overall, participants fal-
sely remembered many of the critical lures. Replicating earlier ﬁndings of Clancy et al. (2000), our
results also lend support to the idea that women reporting recovered CSA memories are more sus-
ceptible than other participants to this memory illusion. More speciﬁcally, women with recovered
memories of CSA exhibited higher rates of false recall and false recognition of critical lures than
the other participants. Our study was the ﬁrst to show that this was true for both neutral and trau-
ma-related word lists, although the eﬀects were more convincing for recognition than for recall
parameters. Taken together, our data are diﬃcult to reconcile with Freyd and Gleaves (1996)
suggestion that the memory illusion tapped by the DRM paradigm would be less strong with
trauma-related words, that is, that participants would have fewer false memories when the items
are trauma-related relative to neutral items. While recall of trauma-related lures was, indeed, less
frequent than recall of neutral lures, false memories did occur and were especially robust in the
recognition modality. This smaller eﬀect for recall of trauma-related words may have to do with
the emotional salience and distinctiveness of the trauma-related words. This is in line with ﬁndings
of Pesta, Murphy, and Sanders (2001) that emotional critical lures are subject to false remember-
ing in the DRM task but at a lower rate than neutral critical lures.
A number of researchers have argued that susceptibility to false memories may be due to a def-
icit in source monitoring, i.e., incorrect judgments about the origin or source of information
(Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Accordingly, the presentation of semantically associated
words activates a concept that is common to all words on the list, namely the critical nonpresented
lure. Thus, the DRM paradigm requires participants to diﬀerentiate between internally generated
thoughts and genuine memories of the studied words (Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo,
2001). The present results suggest that women reporting recovered CSA memories may have a
source monitoring deﬁcit for all types of material, whether the content is neutral or trauma-re-
lated. It can be speculated that especially these women have diﬃculties with the identiﬁcation
of the origin of a memory and that they may have a tendency to adopt an internally generated
thought as being a genuine memory. This could have serious implications, also in everyday life,
both in potential impact on the memory and on the development of their knowledge and beliefs.
Additionally, it might well be the case that source monitoring confusion can produce pseudome-
mories. Therefore, it is very important to recognize that the inﬂuence of source monitoring on the
origin of recovered memories warrants further study. Performance of people with recovered mem-
ories in paradigms that explicitly require source monitoring (e.g., false-fame studies, eyewitness
suggestibility tests) should be investigated.
In the current study, we also explored whether certain traits are associated with the tendency to
develop false memories. Speciﬁcally, we examined whether individual diﬀerences in dissociation
and fantasy proneness were connected to false recall and false recognition on the DRM task. Wo-
men who said they had recovered or repressed CSA memories scored higher on the DES than wo-
men who indicated they had always remembered their abuse or control women. However, unlike
Clancy et al. (2000), we found no signiﬁcant associations between DES scores and false memories
on the DRM paradigm (see for a similar failure: Platt, Lacey, Iobst, & Finkelman, 1998). This fail-
ure could be due to the fact that women in the recovered and repressed memory group had higher
scores on the DES than women in the continuous memory and control group, in comparison to
equivalent DES scores for all subgroups in the study of Clancy et al. (2000). Moreover, it can
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more episodic or autobiographical signature (e.g., Candel, Merckelbach, & Kuijpers, 2003). On the
other hand, fantasy proneness, a close cousin of dissociation, was signiﬁcantly related to false recall
and false recognition. One interpretation of the link between fantasy proneness and false memories
is that self-reported traumatic childhood experiences—whether they have been recovered, re-
pressed or are continuously remembered—contribute to fantasy proneness, thereby making trau-
matized people sensitive to memory illusions like those elicited by the DRM paradigm. Work by
Zoellner et al. (2000) and Bremner et al. (2000) seems to support this line of reasoning. Yet, the
results of the current study indicate that self-reported traumatic experiences are not related to false
recall and false recognition. Note that the CTQ (Bernstein et al., 2003) not only contains items that
refer to speciﬁc episodes of childhood trauma, but also items that measure the belief or impression
that one has experienced aversive childhood events (Merckelbach & Jelicic, 2004). In sum, then,
our data suggest that when it comes to the psychometric correlates of false memories on the
DRM paradigm, fantasy proneness rather than self-reported traumatization runs the show. It
can be speculated that fantasy proneness includes an ability to associate semantically and hence
allowing for more associations which can lead to recall of internally generated thoughts.
Finally, the question arises whether our results have any bearing on the current controversy about
recovered/false memories of CSA. Certainly, they lend support that the illusion of remembering
events that never happened can happen fairly easily and that cognitive impairments related to recov-
ered memories of CSA enhanced susceptibility for false recall and recognition eﬀects. Of course, the
ﬁnding that individuals falsely remember having seen a word in a laboratory context does by no
means imply that their recovered CSA memories are false. Our results do, however, show that wo-
men with recovered CSA memories are, possibly due to a source monitoring deﬁcit, more prone
than others to develop certain types of memory distortions, even with trauma-related material.References
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